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PART I
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
ERNEST L. FOLK, III*
The two South Carolina decisions on administrative law
occur in that crucial area of accommodating the potentially
conflicting roles of agency and court in their orderly per-
formance of the governmental duties allocated to them, often
by vague statutory provisions. As the growing abundance
of federal and state cases show, the problems of adjustment
are unceasing. The two decisions discussed here should
clarify the law in this State, and one in particular deserves to
stand as a guidepost on the scope of judicial review of ad-
ministrative action.
I. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies'
As a general rule, both in federal and state law,2 judicial
review of administrative action is not available unless and
until all available administrative remedies have first been
resorted to, and the litigant seeking judicial review has not
obtained satisfaction from the administrative remedies. In
South Carolina, this rule was applied most recently in Pull-
man Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n.,3 which followed a substan-
tial line of precedents in this state,4 all in accordance with the
generally accepted doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
*Associate Professor of Law, University of South Carolina.
1. The present definitive discussion of the exhaustion concept is found
in 3 DAvis, ADnINIsTRATI'E LAw TREATIsE 56-115 (1958) (hereinafter
cited as DAviS).
2. State and federal law are unexpectedly in harmony on the exhaus-
tion requirement, both as to the general rule and the exceptions. New
Jersey alone seems to have loosened the exhaustion requirement to permit
more frequent and ready court intervention at early stages in the adminis-
trative proceeding. 3 DAvis, 109-113.
3. 234 S. C. 365, 108 S. E. 2d 571 (1959).
4. See Williams Furniture Corp. v. Southern Coatings & Chem. Co.,
216 S. C. 1, 8-10, 56 S. E. 2d 576 (1949). A number of the prior cases
are cited in DePass v. City of Spartanburg, 234 S. C. 198, 203, 107 S. E. 2d
350 (1959). It should be noted, of course, that the exhaustion require-
ment in the administrative law area is but one instance of a broad prin-
ciple of law which requires, for example, exhaustion of remedies within
an organization (such as a union or other association) before challenging
the organization's action in court, or resorting to arbitration where an
agreement so requires.
1
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remedies. In Pullman, a Public Service Commission rule reg-
ulating certain aspects of a passenger railroad service was
challenged by the Pullman Company before the Commission
late in 1956. Some months later, while the proceeding was
still pending before the Commission, the Company sought a
declaratory judgment that the rule was invalid, but the com-
plaint was dismissed for failure to exhaust available Com-
mission remedies. It was this dismissal which the Supreme
Court affirmed on the same grounds.(
The decision correctly states and applies the exhaustion
doctrine. More important, it recognizes that the requirement
is not, and should never be, an invariant rule.7 Rather, it is
a mandate to exercise sound judicial discretion-initially that
of the trial court-as to whether the court's jurisdiction to
hear the case should be exercised at once, or should be de-
ferred until the administrative agency has had a fair oppor-
tunity to decide the questions itself. This recognition is often
impeded by the usual judicial statement of the exhaustion
requirement in absolute terms,8 and by the fact that the great
majority of the reported cases have required the exhaustion
of administrative remedies. Thus, in this State, all the cases
applying the exhaustion rule, including Pullman, have re-
sulted in the court's refusing to hear the case before the
agency has completed its proceedings 9 and in each the decision
to defer judicial action seems entirely correct on the facts.
This sequence of events in the litigation is normally both
fair and orderly. It is fair to the litigant since, after the
administrative remedies have run their course, he almost
5. P. S. C. Rule No. 20 required intrastate railroad passenger cars to
be "continuously in charge of an employee or an authorized agent . . .
having the rank and position of conductor." Pullman Co. v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 234 S. C. at 367, 108 S. E. 2d at 671.
6. It appears that the case was moot when decided by the trial court
on May 6, 1958, since the Commission had denied the petition on March
28 1958, and presumably all relevant administrative remedies had been
exhausted. Technically, the lower court's dismissal should have been va-
cated, and an order dismissing for mootness substituted.
7. "It was a proper exercise of the discretion of the court to refuse to
entertain jurisdiction of the action before appellant had exhausted its
administrative remedies." Pullman Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 234 S. C.
at 368 108 S. E. 2d at 572.
8. For example, in the leading American ease of Myers v. Bethlehem
Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U. S. 41, 45 (1938), Justice Brandeis referred
to "the long settled rule of judicial administration that no one is entitled
to judicial relief for a supposed or threatened injury until the prescribed
administrative remedy has been exhausted," without recognizing that the
supposedly absolute rule, both before and since, has exceptions and quali-
fications.
9. See cases cited in note 4 supa.
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invariably has the opportunity to secure judicial review of
the agency's final order.10 It is also orderly, for without the
exhaustion rule, administrative agencies would be seriously
delayed in getting to the merits of the cases which by law
have been committed to them by court actions, groundless or
otherwise. Finally, as a practical matter, a court will ordi-
narily be in a better postion to determine the issue and review
the administrative action if it has the benefit of the thinking
and decision of the administrative agency.
It follows from the discretionary character of the exhaus-
tion "rule" that there are occasions for dispensing with the
usual requirements. Thus, court intervention, otherwise pre-
mature, would be appropriate if an agency acted patently
outside of its sphere of competence, as if the Industrial Com-
mission sought to regulate intrastate railroad rates; but
would be inappropriate merely on a litigant's claim that the
facts of his particular case do not fall within the agency's
jurisdiction. In short, the agency usually should have the sole
initial right to determine whether a case is or is not within
its jurisdiction." It is also often desirable for "questions of
law," as in Pullman to be first decided by the agency subject
to court review. Similarly, exhaustion may not be required
if an agency with jurisdiction has inadequate administrative
remedies so that the requirement is futile,12 if it acts so as to
violate due process, e.g., by refusing notice or a hearing, if
it is incapable of acting because of deadlock, 13 or if it refuses
to take action for one reason or another or for no reason. 4
In Pullman, the court noted the Commission's "delay in de-
cision" from the hearing on December 11, 1956, to the de-
claratory judgment action in November 1957, but did not elab-
orate on "the reason" which was said to be "in dispute."'1
10. Pullman notes "the approved method to obtain judicial review of
decisions of the Commission affecting carriers," including the very order
challenged here. 234 S. C. at 368, 108 S. E. 2d at 572.
11. On factual matters, obviously the question whether the agency has
jurisdiction of the particular case before it often cannot be decided without
a full inquiry into the merits and facts of the case.
12. 3 DAVIs 99 n. 14.
13. See Order of Railway Conductors v. Swan, 329 U. S. 520 (1947).
14. Smith v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 270 U. S. 587 (1926) (two year
delay in administrative action held to justify dispensing with exhaustion
requirement). An excellent recent example of the kind of agency conduct
which amply justifies a court in dispensing with the exhaustion rule is
Sunshine Pub. Co. v. Summerfield, 184 F. Supp. 767 (D. D. C. 1960),
another stage in the Postmaster-General's war against nudist publications.
By his strategy, he had forfeited any right to the benefit of the exhaustion
requirement.
15. 234 S. C. at 367, 108 S. E. 2d 571.
1960]
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Undoubtedly, on showing that this delay had been unreason-
able, the court would have been warranted in exercising its
discretion to suspend the exhaustion requirement, and pro-
ceeding to a decision itself on the matter. The few facts cited
in the opinion indicate that this was probably unnecessary
here.
II. Scope of Judicial Review of Administrative Action
Mr. Justice Oxner's masterly opinion in Board of Bank
Control v. Thomason0 contributes significantly to clarifying
the vexing problem of the scope of judicial review of decisions
of administrative bodies. The prevailing view, which has
been especially well articulated in the federal system,1 7 is
that administrative action will be sustained if supported by
"substantial evidence" on the record considered as a whole.
Whatever may be the precise contours of this rule, and its
application in any given situation, it is clear that, on the one
hand, agency action is subject to some court review, and on
the other, that hearings and trials de novo will not be fur-
nished by courts to disgruntled litigants. This rule, applied as
it has been to countless cases in every jurisdiction, has, on
balance, given ample protection against administrative arbi-
trariness without, at the same time, inhibiting the freedom
which is essential for effective action by those agencies. It
recognizes that the problems confronting administrative
bodies are often ones which they are peculiarly well equipped
and courts are singularly ill prepared' s to handle, because the
problem is unusually technical. Often they involve a large
number of parties or interests, or generally are not suited to
judicial approaches and procedures. In short, the trend to
the substantial evidence rule is so pronounced that many
statutes which may seem to call for a broader or narrower
scope of review have nevertheless been interpreted as requir-
ing no more than substantial evidence. 19
This is precisely what the Thomason case did. There the
State Board of Bank Control, after notice and hearing, de-
nied an application for a small loan business license, ruling,
16. 236 S. C. 158, 113 S. E. 2d 544 (1960).
17. The leading case is now Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340
U. S. 474 (1951).
18. See LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PRocEss 34-46 (1938).
19. See the cases cited in the majority opinion, 236 S. C. at 165-166,
113 S. E. 2d at 547.
[Vol. 13
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as the statute required,20 that a license would not "promote
the convenience and advantage of the community." This con-
clusion was based on a factual finding that no additional
small loan businesses were needed in the locality. The statute
specified that the reviewing court should "have jurisdiction
to review the facts and the law and to affirm, modify or set
aside the order or decision of the Board and restrain the en-
forcement thereof."2 1 Before determining the correctness of
the Board's fact finding, the court raised the question as to
how far it could go in re-evaluating the underlying evidence.
Rejecting contentions that this statute called for "de novo
review"2 2-apparently the view of dissenting Justice Tay-
lor 23-the court concluded that the Board's findings would
stand if supported by substantial evidence. This reading of
the statute brought judicial review under this statute into
harmony with the substantial evidence rule as applied in other
South Carolina decisions. 24 The Court quite properly referred
to the "experience, expert knowledge and judgment" required
for making many administrative decisions, the Board's "com-
petence in this field," and the "many determinants" of such a
decision. 25 Although it is fashionable today to decry such
reasons as empty clich6s, they nevertheless provide sound
basis for giving, as the substantial evidence rule does, a broad
area in which the agency may freely act.
The reasoning of the majority opinion presents a possible
difficulty for certain classes of cases which may arise in the
future. In concluding that the statute embodies the sub-
stantial evidence rule, the opinion stresses the fact that the
Board's action in granting or withholding a license is a "non-
judicial" function subject to only limited review. Broad re-
view by a court of an agency's "non-judicial" determination
would be constitutionally inappropriate as offending the prin-
ciple of the "separation of powers."2 6 It is, of course, recog-
20. Besides requiring this determination, CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CARO-
lFNA § 8-794.40 (Supp. 1959), requires the Board to make favorable find-
ings as to the applicant's personal and business fitness and financial re-
sponsibility. The Board found on these points in the applicant's favor,
but rested its decision on the absence of need for additional businesses
in the area.
21. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA § 8-794.163 (Supp. 1959).
22. 236 S. C. at 165, 113 S. E. 2d at 547.
23. Id. at 170-73, 113 S. E. 2d at 550-551.
24. These are cited and briefly discussed, id. at 166-167, 113 S. E. 2d
at 548.
25. Id. at 169, 113 S. E. 2d at 549.
26. Id. at 165-65, 113 S. E. 2d at 547.
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nized that "[s]ome administrative bodies perform functions
which are judicial or quasi-judicial. 1 2T It would be unfor-
tunate if the court's language implies that there is to be a
different standard of review of agency decisions depending
upon whether their action is filed in the "judicial or quasi-
judicial" or in the "legislative or quasi-legislative or admin-
istrative" slot. These vague terms are unilluminating, and
certainly afford no standards for distinguishing classes of
cases. The fact is that many agencies, state and federal,
exercise "judicial or quasi-judicial functions," and the same
rule of substantial evidence is consistently applied to review-
ing these "functions." Prime examples in the Federal system
are cease-and-desist orders of the Federal Trade Commission
or the National Labor Relations Board. Few people today
would seriously contend that a broader scope of review is
mecessary.
Despite the disturbing emphasis upon the facile distinction
'between "judicial" and "legislative" functions, it seems un-
likely that the language will be read as varying the scope of
review with the verbal description of the functions. Looking
to the cases cited by the court as embodying the substantial
evidence rule in South Carolina, two involved essentially
"judicial" type administrative proceedings, viz. revocation of
a liquor license28 and of a license for practicing naturopathy.
29
These two cases framed the scope of review of facts as limited
to "findings ... wholly unsupported by the evidence," 30 but
the effect of the Thomason case is to harmonize this language
'with the "substantial evidence" test.3 ' Finally, it is necessary,
for the sake of consistency, that the same test as to the scope
of review apply to both types of proceedings. Otherwise, in
the very statute under which Thomason was decided, grant
or denial of a license (a "quasi-legislative" function) would
be subject to the relatively narrow test of "substantial evi-
,dence," while the Board's action in revoking or suspending an
already granted license32 (a "quasi-judicial" function) would
be subject to a different, and presumably broader, scope of
27. Ibid.
28. Feldman v. South Carolina Tax Comm'n., 203 S. C. 49, 55, 26 S. E.
2d 22 (1943).
29. Jacoby v. South Carolina State Board of Naturopathic Ex'rs., 219
S. C. 66, 88-90, 64 S. E. 2d 138 (1951).
30. See the page citations in the two notes above.
31. 236 S. C. at 166-167, 113 S. E. 2d at 548.
82. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA § 8-794.44-46 (Supp. 1959) pro-
vides for Board action of this type.
[Vol. 13
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review. In reality, both procedures are in furtherance of the
single objective of sound regulation in the public interest, and
are governed by the same code section providing for judicial
review.33 The alluring but dangerous short cut of distinguish-
ing "quasi-legislative" and "quasi-judicial" action for pur-
poses of framing the scope of review should be avoided. 4
33. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA § 8-794.163 (Supp. 1959).
34. This article does not discuss the character of the evidence which the
Court held adequately supported the Board's refusal to grant the license.
See Board of Bank Control v. Thomason, 236 S. C. at 169-70, 113 S. E.
2d at 546, 549-550.
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